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Abstract 
Building on a Government of Canada 
sponsored seminar on Canadian and 
international perspectives on youth policy and 
research, the Policy Research Initiative (2006) 
has highlighted a resurgence of interest among 
researchers on the risks, opportunities and 
challenges that many young people face across 
industrialized countries. Various social, 
demographic and economic changes have 
altered the life experience of the young, which 
has modified the opportunities and risks 
encountered in navigating into adult roles.  
 
The objective of this study is to largely describe 
some of the most salient of these changes, with 
a careful review of existing Canadian literature 
and published empirical research. Of particular 
interest are important changes in the life course 
patterns of the young, in terms of later home 
leaving, later completion of education, delayed 
full time entrance into the labour force, later 
union formation, and later childbearing. We also 
review available data sources highlighting 
changes on the basis of existing survey and 
census data, while carefully considering 
evidence as to whether we have encountered 
climbing social inequalities among Canadian 
youth. 
 
While these delayed life cycle transitions are 
becoming increasingly recognized among 
researchers and the general public, there is only 
a limited amount of research in Canada that 
explicitly considers some of the more important 
consequences of these changes. For this reason, 
the study also reviews the limited empirical 
research that has focused on some of these 
implications. While the transitions work 
properly for most youth, we address a 
fundamental research issue raised by the PRI 
(2006): what are some of the drivers and 
impacts on vulnerable youth populations?  We 
place these vulnerabilities into the broader 
context of population groups that are more 
vulnerable: female lone parents, unattached 
adults aged 55-64, recent immigrants and 
Aboriginal populations. The difficult living 
circumstances of these groups can be linked 
either directly or indirectly to family and life 
cycle questions.  
 
Transitions between youth and adulthood are 
structured by a complex system of socio-
economic structures, institutional arrangements 
and cultural patterns that can vary in an 
important manner across nation states. This 
broader context is examined can potentially 
provide some insight as to why transitions tend 
to be more prolonged in certain settings while 
being relatively short in others. The study 
includes some international comparisons of 
different “transition regimes” and discusses 
related policy implications. 
Sommaire 
À la suite du séminaire parrainé par le 
gouvernement du Canada sur les perspectives 
canadiennes et internationales sur les politiques et la 
recherche concernant les jeunes, le Projet de recherche 
sur les politiques (2006) a mis en relief une 
recrudescence de l’intérêt des chercheurs pour les 
risques, les possibilités et les défis auxquels de 
nombreux jeunes sont confrontés dans tous les pays 
industrialisés. Divers changements sociaux, 
démographiques et économiques ont changé 
l’expérience de vie des jeunes, ce qui a modifié les 
possibilités et les risques qui les attendent en 
assumant des rôles d’adultes.  
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L’objectif de cette étude consiste à décrire en termes 
généraux certains des changements les plus 
importants en passant en revue les études et 
recherches empiriques publiées au Canada. Un 
intérêt particulier a été accordé aux importants 
changements dans les modèles de parcours de vie des 
jeunes, qui quittent le domicile parental, terminent 
les études, entrent sur le marché du travail à temps 
plein, forment des unions et ont des enfants plus 
tard. Nous examinons aussi les sources de données 
disponibles soulignant les changements selon des 
données de sondages et de recensement. Ce faisant, 
nous serons attentifs aux indications que les 
inégalités sociales seraient à la hausse chez les jeunes 
Canadiens. 
 
Bien que ces transitions retardées du parcours de vie 
soient de plus en plus reconnues par les chercheurs et 
par le grand public, il n’y a que peu de recherches 
effectuées au Canada qui se penchent explicitement 
sur certaines des principales conséquences de ces 
changements. C’est pourquoi cette étude examine 
aussi les rares recherches empiriques qui ont porté 
sur certaines de ces implications. Bien que les 
transitions se passent convenablement pour la 
plupart des jeunes, nous abordons une question 
fondamentale soulevée par le PRP (2006), à savoir 
s’il est possible de cerner les facteurs touchant les 
populations plus vulnérables de jeunes et leurs 
répercussions. Nous situons ces vulnérabilités dans le 
contexte plus vaste des groupes au sein de la 
population qui sont plus vulnérables: mères seules, 
adultes seuls de 55 à 64 ans, immigrants récents et 
Autochtones. Les conditions de vie difficiles de ces 
groupes peuvent être reliées soit directement, soit 
indirectement à des questions touchant la famille et 
le cycle de vie. 
 
Les transitions de la jeunesse à l’âge adulte sont 
structurées par un système complexe de structures 
socioéconomiques, de dispositifs institutionnels et de 
modèles culturels qui peuvent varier de façon 
importante entre États-nations. Ce contexte plus 
vaste peut aider à comprendre pourquoi les 
transitions ont tendance à se prolonger dans certains 
cas tout en étant relativement courtes dans d’autres. 
Cette étude inclus également certaines comparaisons 
internationales de différents « régimes de transition » 
ainsi qu’une discussion des implications pour les 
politiques pertinentes. 
 
1. Introduction 
Building on a Government of Canada 
sponsored seminar on Canadian and 
international perspectives on youth policy and 
research, the Policy Research Initiative (PRI, 
2006) has highlighted a resurgence of interest 
among researchers on the risks, opportunities, 
and challenges that many young people face 
across industrialized countries. Various social, 
demographic, and economic changes have 
altered the life experience of the young, which 
has modified the opportunities and risks 
encountered in navigating into adult roles. This 
working paper describes some of the most 
salient of these changes, with a careful review of 
existing Canadian literature and published 
empirical research. Of particular interest are 
important changes in the life-course patterns of 
the young, in terms of later home leaving, later 
completion of education, delayed full-time 
entrance into the labour force, later union 
formation, and later childbearing. We also 
review available data sources highlighting 
changes on the basis of existing survey and 
census data, while carefully considering 
evidence as to whether we have encountered 
rising social inequalities among Canadian youth. 
The transitions in the life course associated with 
family and work have historically been marked 
as delineating adulthood. Due to their policy 
importance, these transitions have been the 
subject of considerable study by sociologists 
and social demographers. As indicated in 
Beaujot (2000), there has not only been a delay 
in many of these transitions, but these 
transitions themselves have become more fluid 
and less clear. Since these life-cycle events are 
increasingly delayed, the current report shifts 
the age boundaries typically used in the 
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delineation of youth through to older ages    
(15-29 years).  
The delays over the last four decades are in 
marked contrast to previous decades where 
transitions occurred at increasingly younger 
average ages. In particular, cohorts born 
between the world wars experienced a transition 
to adulthood that was compressed into a 
relatively short period of completing formal 
education, entering the labour force, leaving 
home, establishing a nuclear household, and 
having a first child. For subsequent cohorts, not 
only has this standardization broken down, but 
the early life-course transitions extend over a 
longer period. The sequencing is more diverse 
and the events themselves are less clearly 
defined. 
While researchers and the public increasingly 
recognize these delayed life-cycle transitions, a 
limited amount of research in Canada explicitly 
considers some of the more important 
consequences of these changes. For this reason, 
the current working paper reviews the limited 
empirical research that has focused on some of 
these implications. While the transitions work 
properly for most youth, we address a 
fundamental research issue raised by the PRI 
(2006): what are some of the drivers and 
impacts on vulnerable youth populations? We 
place these vulnerabilities into the broader 
context of population groups that are more 
vulnerable. Hatfield (2005) proposed that 
persistent low income is particularly high for the 
following groups: female lone parents, 
unattached adults aged 55-64, recent 
immigrants, and Aboriginal populations. The 
difficult living circumstances of these groups 
can be linked either directly or indirectly to 
family and life-cycle questions.  
The current working paper includes the 
following sections: 
 a theoretical discussion of youth 
transition patterns; 
 a review of empirical data on early adult 
transitions (home leaving, union 
formation, first childbirth, school 
attendance, and employment); 
 a consideration of these same transitions 
for immigrant and Aboriginal youth; 
 a summary of some of the consequences 
of these delays (particularly in terms of 
whether youth have become more 
fragmented over recent years); and 
 a summary that draws international 
comparisons using a typology on 
“transition regimes” and closes with a 
discussion on relevant policy 
implications.  
In terms of theoretical background, we consider 
three broad conceptual frameworks, including 
the evolution of the life course (Kaplan, 1997), 
gender and the division of work in production 
and reproduction (Becker, 1991; Oppenheimer, 
1988, 1997; Beaujot, 2000), and the second 
demographic transition and flexibility in families 
(Lesthaeghe and Neels, 2002; Beaujot, 2004). 
Our conclusion involves a brief discussion of 
policy areas that can potentially be informed by 
socio-economic and demographic changes 
highlighted in the current report. 
2. Conceptual Background on 
 the Changing Realities of 
 Youth 
The theoretical basis for studying youth 
transition patterns can usefully be placed in 
three conceptual frameworks:  
 the evolution of the human life course; 
 gender and the division of work in 
production and reproduction; and  
 the second demographic transition and 
flexibility in families.  
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Evolution of the Human Life Course 
Many of our major institutions are built around 
the fact that consumption occurs throughout 
the life course while production obviously does 
not. This lack of congruence between 
production and consumption, and the 
consequent periods of dependency, underlie 
families as a means of transfer and support, as 
well as larger kin networks, and various private 
and public institutions. For example, consider 
the banking system in this context, which exists 
due to the need for savings, investments, and 
insurance, both private and collective. Stated 
differently, the structural constraints on the life 
course include consumption and production, 
and the associated opportunities and 
constraints, as well as societal structures, 
policies, and regulations (Corijn, 2001). 
Caldwell (2004) proposed that reproductive 
partnerships were particularly important in pre-
modern agricultural societies, where families 
were units of both production and 
reproduction. Industrial societies are less 
organized around families, allowing for looser 
relationships, more alternate family models, 
along with less strict morality on sexuality and 
relationships. Reproductive partnerships have 
become less important from a macro-economic 
point of view, but they largely retain their 
significance for children as dependants. A 
longer period of juvenile dependence 
characterizes family life in industrial societies, as 
does longer life expectancies and a substantial 
period of post-reproductive productivity. One 
reason the period of adolescence and youth has 
been extended relates to the need for more 
investments in skills, for both men and women.  
Kaplan (1997) proposed studying the life course 
in terms of maximizing fitness and 
consumption. This brings reproductive trade-
offs between early and late reproduction, and 
quantity and quality of offspring. In his theory 
of the evolution of the human life course, 
Kaplan (1997) made the case that greater 
efficiency in production is achieved at the 
expense of a longer period of childhood and 
adolescent dependence. Productivity then 
continues over a longer life span, beyond the 
ages at which reproduction takes place. Post-
reproductive productivity permits transfers to 
the younger generation as they enter adult ages, 
and thus supports their reproduction. 
Historically, this often involved offspring living 
with grandparents for given periods. Thus, even 
at typical ages for starting reproduction, given 
the additional transfers of reproduction itself, 
there is dependence on older post-reproductive 
individuals who remain productive. Various 
stages of the human life course have long been 
dynamically interrelated and, of course, this 
remains the case in modern societies.  
In a competitive world, intergenerational 
transfers are particularly important to the 
opportunities of youth. While there are 
complaints about KIPPERS (Kids In Parents’ 
Pockets Eroding Retirement Savings), young 
people benefit from more transfers from 
parents and transfers over a longer period. 
Youth will be vulnerable if they profit less from 
these transfers and if they have insufficient 
investments in themselves before transiting to 
their own family and work. 
Gender and the Division of Work in 
Production and Reproduction 
The context of the life course takes on different 
dimensions depending on the gender division of 
labour in families. If we consider that the main 
activities of families include earning a living and 
caring for each other, then it matters how these 
activities are divided by gender (Beaujot, 2000; 
Beaujot and Liu, 2005). The dynamics will be 
rather different in families based on traditional 
“complementary roles” (e.g., the traditional 
breadwinner model), as compared to what some 
have called “new families” (based on a two-
worker model with a more symmetrical division 
of paid and unpaid work). In appreciating this 
fact, a gender perspective can be considered key 
to understanding both the evolution of the 
family life course as well as the timing of both 
union formation and reproduction in the 
contemporary context. 
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When there was specialization, with men 
focusing on economic production and women 
on reproduction, there was probably less need 
for women to delay family function. As long as 
young men had good economic opportunities, 
marriages could take place at a relatively early 
age. This situation characterized the baby boom 
era in Canada, when female labour force 
participation was relatively low and the 
economic opportunities for young men were 
improving. In the 1950s, there was no great 
need for a particularly long period of education 
beyond the teenage years. Paid work and family 
care were both considered full-time jobs, 
although this complementary-roles model of 
marriage brought some risk for women and 
children. In the absence of labour market 
experience, women were much more likely to 
marry and have children at a relatively young 
age, although this placed them in a particularly 
vulnerable position since complementary roles 
lacked insurance against the loss of the 
breadwinner.  
In “Gender Equity in Theories of Fertility 
Transition,” McDonald (2000) proposed that 
women’s power and status increased in families, 
even when their status was low in the broader 
society. Women’s status in families was 
especially enhanced when they came to have 
better control over their own reproduction. In 
contrast, women’s status in families and, 
consequently, also outside of families is 
particularly low when they have no control over 
their own marital and parental status. Similarly, 
Folbre (2000) saw the gender change over the 
past century as women’s increasing ability to 
make decisions on relationships and 
childbearing, based on self-interest. This was 
linked to the promotion of equal opportunities 
within the family for the education of girls and 
boys, as gender has essentially disappeared as an 
ascriptive factor in determining levels of 
education (Wanner, 1999). Over more recent 
decades, new family arrangements have become 
more prevalent, as both men and women set 
out to optimize their lifetime economic 
production. As both genders seek to obtain the 
skills necessary in establishing themselves in the 
labour force, young adults are more likely to 
postpone reproduction and other early life 
transitions. Over the last several decades, the 
labour force participation of women with and 
without children has risen by a substantial 
degree, while that of men actually declined 
somewhat. 
It would appear that childbearing is particularly 
low in societies where women have approached 
equal status in the non-family institutions of 
society (in education and the labour market), 
but where mothers carry an excessive burden 
within the family (McDonald, 1997; Chesnais, 
1996). Faced with a choice between high status 
in the labour force and low status in families, 
women are prompted to have “no families” 
(Goldscheider and Waite, 1991). Berk (1985) 
used the concept of families as a gender factory 
to highlight the way the division of labour in 
households promoted gender differentiation. 
Subsequently, these changes in gender roles led 
many women to delay or completely forgo 
marriage and childbearing altogether. However, 
some “new men” have come to see the value of 
productive roles for both women and men, of 
maintaining relationships based on equality, and 
of sharing in unpaid work as a form of 
mutuality (Coltrane, 1995).  
Oppenheimer (1988) proposed a “theory of 
marriage timing” that considers how union 
formation is related to the opportunity 
structures of both men and women; if these 
opportunities are somewhat comparable, 
marriages are more likely to occur when both 
men and women have higher achieved status. In 
particular, Oppenheimer (1997) attributed the 
delay in marriage to the difficulty that young 
men have had in establishing their work lives, 
and to the importance attached to the work 
lives of both spouses. That is, young adults will 
search longer for a spouse if there is a longer 
period of uncertainty before each person’s 
economic future can be predicted. In a 
qualitative survey that asked when it was best to 
start a union or get married, respondents from 
London, Ontario, largely said that it was best to 
wait until education is completed, and work 
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lives are being established (Beaujot, 2000). That 
is, given the importance of work to a couple’s 
lifestyle, the delayed entry into relationships 
follows on the longer period of education and 
the difficulty in establishing secure jobs. In 
other words, the continuity of past gender 
patterns appears to persist for many couples, 
particularly in terms of occupational choice, 
where women continue to be much more likely 
than men to select jobs that permit more 
flexibility for raising children (Ranson, 1995, 
1998). 
 
Other constraints on young adults include the 
decreased value of youth labour over recent 
years, and the disadvantaged situation of 
cohorts that have followed the baby boom. 
Many structural factors appear to promote the 
“new family” or “collaborative model” for the 
division of earning and caring activities, where 
permanent relationships start after both 
partners establish their career trajectories. In the 
two-worker model, with its dual agendas of 
work and family, there are further constraints 
on the early life transitions of both women and 
men. In the contemporary context, youth will 
be vulnerable if they form reproductive 
relationships before establishing the secure basis 
for two-income families. Early marriage or 
cohabitation and childbearing typically imply a 
lower level of education and fewer 
opportunities in the labour market. For women 
and children not in two-income families, this is 
often associated with economic hardship and 
poverty. 
The Second Demographic Transition 
and Flexibility in Families 
The concept of the second demographic 
transition has especially been used to interpret 
the fertility trends of the past 40 years. The first 
transition, from about 1870 to 1945, brought 
smaller families, especially because of changes in 
the economic costs and benefits of children, 
along with a cultural environment that made it 
more appropriate to control family size. The 
second transition since the mid-1960s, has been 
linked to a continuation of low fertility, a 
further tendency to delay births, as well as an 
increased flexibility in marital relationships 
(Lesthaeghe, 1995; Beaujot, 2000: 85-96).  
The most obvious indicators of increased 
flexibility are seen in the means of entry and exit 
from relationships. Divorce as a means of exit 
from relationships was first envisioned as a 
solution to extreme problems in a marriage, and 
the presence of children was often an important 
reason not to divorce (Keyfitz, 1994: 7). The 
norms have since changed to the point that 
people consider a good divorce as better than a 
bad marriage (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn, 1988). In 
addition, this increased flexibility is also seen in 
change in the acceptability of premarital sex and 
cohabitation. Cohabitation was to eventually 
transform premarital relationships, just as it has 
come to transform marital relationships 
themselves. Le Bourdais and Lapierre-Adamcyk 
(2004) proposed that in Quebec cohabitation is 
becoming an alternative to marriage in the sense 
of being a lasting arrangement in which to raise 
children, while outside of Quebec it has become 
a socially acceptable living arrangement, so 
becoming a parent is no longer restricted to 
marriage. 
The contrasts between the first and second 
demographic transitions suggest important 
differences in the relevance of children to social 
cohesion (Lesthaeghe and Neels, 2002). 
Lesthaeghe and Neels (2002) proposed that the 
first demographic transition saw increased social 
cohesion, while the second demographic 
transition is linked to a weakening role of 
families in social cohesion. The first transition is 
associated with the economic development that 
brought higher standards of living and 
aspirations for increased consumption. The 
cultural side of this transition included the 
legitimacy of deliberate control over births, but 
it also included a uniform family model based 
on prudent marriage and responsible 
parenthood. The second transition is linked 
with secularization and the growing importance 
placed on individual autonomy. Thus, the family 
model predominant at mid-century based on 
intact marriages gave way to a diversity of family 
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types corresponding to the interest in autonomy 
and post-material aspirations.  
During the first transition, the structural and 
cultural conditions included strong 
identification with a homogeneous family type 
whereas the second transition involved a 
weakening in this identification, given the 
greater importance of individual autonomy. 
Childbearing was increasingly seen as a means 
of individual gratification (Ariès, 1980; Giddens, 
1991). In particular, the second demographic 
transition includes a weakening of the norms 
against divorce, premarital sex, cohabitation, 
and voluntary childlessness. That is, there is a 
greater focus on individual rights along with less 
regulation of the private lives of individuals by 
the larger community (Thornton, 2001). Yet 
despite these changes, there has also been 
continuity, as for example, the division of 
domestic labour between couples continues to 
be “very much gendered” regardless of being 
married or cohabiting (Kerr et al., 2006). While 
the second demographic transition has meant 
greater plurality and diversity, these changes 
hold important implications for women, men, 
and children, some for the better and some for 
the worse. For women, it has meant that, 
compared to men, they are less likely to be in a 
relationship later in life, and they are more likely 
to be with children. That is, they are less likely 
to have the support of a partner, and they are 
more likely to care for dependent children. On 
the other hand, men are less likely to have 
lifelong relationships of emotional exchange 
with their children. For children, it means less 
stability in parenting. 
Some have proposed that diversity can include 
bifurcation wherein some young people benefit 
from the quality support of two earning and 
caring parents, while others, especially if they 
are born to young parents, are less likely to have 
the support of two parents, and their parents 
may be hard pressed to meet the earning and 
caring needs (McLanahan, 2004). That is, initial 
disadvantages encourage further demographic 
patterns that enhance the disadvantages. In 
elaborating on the links between demographic 
and socio-economic vulnerability, Kiernan 
(2002: 84-95) observed a “long arm of 
demography” in the sense that family 
demographics are differentiated based on the 
extent to which individuals are disadvantaged. 
This selectivity has further implications for 
subsequent vulnerability. Kiernan paid 
particular attention to youthful parenthood, 
unmarried families, and parental separation and 
divorce, as demographics that are linked to 
disadvantage.  
3. Early Adult Transitions 
Events associated with the transition to 
adulthood (home leaving, completion of 
education, full-time employment, union 
formation, and childbearing) have generally 
been studied separately rather than in 
conjunction with one another. Despite this fact, 
the various indicators on these transitions (e.g., 
the average age at which persons marry or age-
specific fertility rates) have all moved in the 
same direction over the past several decades, in 
Canada and across most industrialized societies. 
Adolescence and young adulthood appear to 
have become more delayed, protracted and less 
orderly than in the past. Recent changes in the 
timing on these intertwined and interdependent 
life-cycle events imply that the transition to 
adulthood has become increasingly extended 
well into the third decade of life. 
In summarizing American research, Furstenberg 
(2000) highlighted the substantial proportion of 
young adults whose transition to adulthood 
appears to continue well into their latter 20s and 
even early 30s. Needless to say, these changes 
carry profound implications for society, as 
young adults take longer to establish themselves 
residentially, economically, in full-time 
employment, as well as to form their own 
families. As Mitchell (2006) noted, this is even 
more complicated by the fact that transitions to 
adulthood also appear to be less permanent and 
subject to reversibility. The PRI (2006) pointed 
to what it considers the prolonged, complex, 
fragmented and often non-linear nature of 
transitions for young people today relative to 
previous generations.  
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As young adults prolong their schooling and 
delay full-time employment, some, yet obviously 
not all, continue to receive support from 
parents, making a protracted period of semi-
dependence across generations. This semi-
dependence manifests itself in the growing 
proportion of young Canadians who delay 
establishing their own households, and on 
moving out, the significant proportion who 
return home on either a temporary or extended 
basis. 
Leaving Home 
Young people are far more likely to live at home 
if they are studying full time, are unemployed, 
are single and/or have relatively low earnings 
through their labour force involvement. 
Similarly, once a person enters into a 
relationship, whether through marriage or 
cohabitation, they are much less likely to live 
with their parents (even in the event of 
separation/divorce). In appreciating the extent 
to which these life-cycle events are associated, it 
is not surprising that the median age at home 
leaving has risen steadily over recent decades. 
As Canadians increasingly delay employment, 
extend their studies and delay 
marriage/cohabitation, they are less likely to 
move from their parent’s home.  
For the cohort of baby boomers aged 50-54 in 
2005, the average age at home leaving was only 
about 21.5 years for men and only 19.9 years for 
women (Beaujot, 2000). In contrast, consider 
Figure 1, which provides information on the 
percentage of young adults living at home, by 
single years of age, in both 1991 and 2001. The 
2001 Census showed that fully 50 percent of all 
men were still living at home at about the age of 
24, whereas roughly 50 percent of women were 
still living at home at about the age of 22.5. 
Relative to earlier decades, the proportion of 
young adults continuing to live with parents has 
continued to climb, and this shift toward older 
ages has been equally true for both men and 
women. By the age of 29, one in five men still 
live with their parent(s), while roughly one in 
ten women are in the same situation. 
Most researchers focus on various economic 
factors associated with a delay in home leaving. 
Establishing an independent residence is largely 
seen as a critical step in the transition to 
adulthood, in marking a shift from some forms 
of dependence to greater economic autonomy 
(Goldscheider and Goldscheider, 1999). In their 
explanation of why young people delay this sort 
of autonomy, Lapierre-Adamcyk et al. (1995) 
paid particular attention to the more difficult 
economic times that young people have faced 
over recent decades, as young men in particular 
experienced downward pressures on earnings. 
In addition, young women appear increasingly 
to be pursuing strategies that resemble those of 
men, seeking to put off establishing their own 
households and families to give priority to their 
work status. Goldscheider and Goldscheider 
(1993) supplemented this explanation by 
considering how cultural factors have made 
parental homes more suitable to older children. 
For example, generation gaps appear to have 
narrowed and parents have established more 
egalitarian relationships with their children.  
Figure 1: Youth Living with Parents 
(%), by Age and Sex (1991-2001) 
 
Males 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 10  
Females 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Census, Public Use 
Files, 1991, 2001. 
This tendency of young adults to live with their 
parents is at least partially due to an increased 
tendency for young people to return home after 
having already left home for school, to establish 
a union or obtain employment. Mitchell (2006) 
referred to these returnees as “boomerang 
kids,” defined as leaving and returning for a 
minimum of a four-month spell. The 2001 
General Social Survey (GSS) provides 
information on the home-leaving process, and 
demonstrates the extent to which leaving the 
parental home does not preclude returning. For 
example, in working with this definition, about 
33 percent of men and 28 percent of women 
aged 20 to 29 returned home at least once after 
an initial departure.  
Late home leaving and returning to the parental 
home have often been discussed in negative 
terms. For instance, Boyd and Pryor (1989) 
referred to the “cluttered nest.” In some 
regards, this delay is counter to the “idea of 
progress” underlying family trends, as implied 
by the growth of individualism. Leaving home 
and establishing an independent residence is 
considered a critical step in the transition to 
adulthood, in shifting from some forms of 
dependence to greater autonomy. This is a 
cultural norm. 
Making international comparisons, Palomba 
(2001) suggested that very late departures may 
be detrimental to the independence of young 
people. Contrasts across countries suggest that 
home leaving is later when children depend on 
transfers within the family, and earlier if there 
are more state transfers, as in Nordic countries 
(Reher, 1998; Breen and Buchmann, 2002; 
Iacovou, 2002). For cohorts born around 1960, 
the median age at men’s home leaving ranges 
from 26 or 27 years in Italy and Spain, to 20 
years in Sweden (Billari et al., 2001). 
Independence from parents at affordable costs 
is reduced when there is a poor housing market 
and a lack of rental accommodation. In 
contrast, greater social transfers to young 
people, as occurs in Sweden, allow more 
independence from parents. In light of some of 
these differences, this recent shift toward 
delayed home leaving may be considered 
problematic to the extent to which the young 
are blocked in terms of establishing 
independence. Allahar and Côté (1998) spoke of 
a category of vulnerable youth who appear to 
“waste their time” rather than becoming 
independent adults. One hears of 30 year olds 
who require more time to establish themselves 
and actually think about what to do with their 
life. There are obviously consequences of this 
prolonged period before “full adulthood,” as 
many youth continue with educational pursuits, 
job exploration, and experimentation with 
romantic relationships, while continuing to rely 
on parents for housing support. 
Some youth may make their transitions too late 
and others make them too early. Early home 
leaving is sometimes problematic, as for 
example, in cases where there are problems for 
completion of high school, establishing savings, 
and receiving transfers from parents. Bernhardt 
et al. (2003) found that early home leaving is 
linked to lower educational aspirations and 
lower educational attainment. This is 
particularly the case when the departure is due 
to a push factor, such as family conflict. These 
early departures lead to a reduction in the 
quantity and quality of contact with both 
parents, and have negative consequences for 
successful career patterns and stable families. 
Obviously, the implications of delayed home 
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leaving depend on the extent to which extra 
time is devoted to accumulating human and 
financial capital. In particular, a delay in leaving 
home allows youth to invest longer in 
themselves and to profit longer from transfers 
from their parents, thus permitting transitions 
that benefit the individual.  
School Attendance  
The minimum qualification for employment in 
Canada is generally considered the high school 
diploma. This certification permits further 
opportunities in terms of both education and 
establishing oneself in the labour market. Most 
youth in Canada succeed in obtaining this 
degree. Data from 2003 suggest that about 75 
percent of young Canadians have their high 
school diploma by the age of 18 (Shaienks et al., 
2006). Among those who drop out, many 
eventually take an indirect route to graduation, 
such that by the age of 22 the high school 
graduation rate increases to 90 percent, an all 
time high in Canada. The economic situation 
among youth in Canada who do not succeed in 
high school is obviously very difficult. For 
example, Bowlby (2005) estimated a 19 percent 
unemployment rate in 2002 for high school 
drop-outs aged 20-24. This is a particularly 
vulnerable group of youth, with long-term 
difficulties anticipated given the fundamental 
role of skills and knowledge in fully 
participating in the economic and social life of 
Canada. 
The transition to the completion of formal 
education is somewhat difficult to mark, 
because the future may bring a return to the 
classroom (e.g., eventually returning to high 
school after dropping out as a teenager). Yet 
there can be no doubt that participation rates 
are up considerably, for both college and 
university attendance, as a growing proportion 
of youth seek post-secondary credentials. In 
1961, only eight percent of 20-24 year olds 
attended a post-secondary educational 
institution. This increased to 41.6 percent by 
1991 and fully 48.5 percent by 2001. As 
demonstrated in Figure 2, across most ages, 
participation rates have risen in terms of both 
college and university attendance in Canada, 
when comparing the 1993-1994 and 2003-2004 
academic years. While college participation rates 
are down slightly for teenagers, university 
participation rates are up. Among young adults 
in their early 20s, both college and university 
participation rates are up. The completion of 
formal education occurs at older and older ages, 
as young adults take advantage of an extended 
period to gain human capital for entrance into 
the labour force, or as they better position 
themselves in relation to others in a difficult 
labour market. At the age of 25 years, almost 
one in six young adults still attend university or 
college. At the age of 29, about one in ten 
continue with their post-secondary education.  
The tremendous growth in the number of post-
secondary graduates over recent decades, 
reflects the demand for skills in the Canadian 
economy. No other OECD nation has a higher 
proportion of youth attending university and 
college (OECD, 2002). According to the 2001 
Census, 28 percent of all individuals aged 25-34 
in 2001 had university qualifications, 21 percent 
held a college diploma, and another 12 percent 
had trade credentials. In all, 61 percent of 
individuals in this age group had qualifications 
beyond high school. In comparison, at the time 
of the 1991 Census, 49 percent of those aged 
25-34 had post-secondary credentials. Other 
comparisons show that Canada has particularly 
high enrolment rates at ages 18-21, but by age 
24 is at about the middle of OECD countries 
(Fussell, 2002).  
The downside of this shift in educational 
qualifications is that a growing proportion of 
Canadians are underemployed relative to their 
qualifications. Li et al. (2006) recently estimated 
that nearly one out of every five people in the 
work force with a university education works in 
a job that requires, at most, high school 
education. In drawing comparisons over time, it 
was estimated that the number of university-
educated workers who were overqualified in 
such a manner increased by nearly one third in 
2001 relative to 1993.  
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Figure 2: Participation Rates at the 
College and University Levels, Canada, 
1993-1994 and 2003-2004 
 
Participation Rate at the College Level 
Participation Rate at the University 
Level 
 
Source:  Statistics Canada. 2005. Education indicators in 
Canada: Report of the Pan-Canadian Education Indicators 
Program. Catalogue no. 81-582-XIE. Ottawa. 
A 2002 survey on educational planning found 
that most parents (93 percent) expect their 
children to pursue post-secondary studies, while 
75 percent expect a university degree (Shipley et 
al., 2003). Yet only half of these parents were 
making savings to help their children, with 
another 30 percent reporting that they planned 
to start saving in the future. The savings of 
parents are often small in comparison to the 
actual cost of post-secondary education, 
particularly in a context of climbing tuition fees. 
Not surprisingly, many youth rely on loans and 
bursaries to cover basic expenses, such that 
about one half of college graduates and 
bachelor graduates leave school owing money 
for their education, mostly in the form of 
government student loans (Allen and 
Vaillancourt, 2004). While a majority of 
graduates did not report difficulties paying their 
debt, about one fourth of bachelor graduates 
and almost a third of college graduates reported 
difficulties with repayment. A small, but notable 
proportion of graduates completed their 
education with large debts. About 14 percent of 
students graduating with bachelor degrees 
owed $25,000 or more in government student 
loans (Allen and Vaillancourt, 2004).  
In charting the transition from high school to 
post-secondary education and the labour 
market, Table 1 provides information on the 
distribution of the population aged 15-29 by 
education level and labour force participation. 
For example, at the age of 15, the overwhelming 
majority in 2003-2004 were studying and not in 
the labour force (70 percent), about one in four 
(24.6 percent) were combining their studies with 
employment, while relatively few were either 
not studying or in the labour force (2.4 percent), 
not studying yet working (1.1 percent), or fast 
tracked into college (1.1 percent). By the age of 
20, about half were no longer studying (i.e., 35.8 
percent working, 6.4 percent unemployed, and 
an additional 5.8 percent neither studying nor 
part of the labour force). Since there is so much 
pressure on young people to obtain post-
secondary credentials, it is not surprising that so 
many youth take the strenuous route of 
combining their studies with part-time or even 
full-time employment, true of both college and 
university students. 
As educational enrolment involves a high 
degree of dependence, young people of both 
genders are considerably more likely to continue 
living with a parent, as well as delay other 
fundamental life-cycle transitions. Survey 
research documented normative expectations 
that young people attending school should not 
consider marriage or childbearing until 
completion of their schooling and entrance into 
the labour market (Blossfeld, 1995). Women’s 
increased education delays union formation for 
both genders, but childbearing is delayed 
beyond what would be expected simply on the 
basis of educational enrolment. This is reflected 
in available statistics: while longer schooling is 
clearly involved in the delay of early life 
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transitions, it is noteworthy that for men the 
median age of school completion for the 1971-
1975 cohort was 21.5 years, while that of first 
union was more than 25 years, and first 
childbirth over 31 years (extending the trends 
from older cohorts shown in Ravanera et al., 
2002: 299). Similarly, women of the 1971-1975 
cohort completed their education at a median 
age of 21.8 years, compared to 23 years for first 
union and about 28 years for birth of first child 
(Ravanera et al., 1998: 187-189). Women’s 
longer education may delay men’s entry into 
first unions, but childbearing seems to be 
delayed beyond the ages when education is 
completed for both genders.  
Into the Labour Force 
The transition from school into the labour force 
typically takes place over a number of years, as 
young people who are still students begin 
working part time. The OECD (1997) suggested 
that the starting age of the school-to-work 
transition be estimated as the last age at which 
more than 75 percent of youths only attend 
school. The end of this transition would occur 
when more than half only work. In applying this 
classification, the school-to-work transition now 
takes place over a more extended period, as an 
increased proportion of young people continue 
to pursue their education well into their 20s (see 
Table 1). While the average age in which young 
people begin this transition has not changed 
noticeably over recent decades (at roughly age 
16), the pursuit of college and university 
credentials has pushed the end of this 
transitional period toward ages that have 
historically been associated with working, 
marriage, and childbearing.  
Table 1: Distribution of the Population Aged 15 to 29 by Education Level, Labour Force 
Status, and Age, Canada, 2003-2004 
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 15 to 29
Non-student NILF1 2.4 2.5 2.9 4.6 5.7 5.8 5.4 6.2 6.8 7.3 8.1 9.1 9.3 9.0 8.8 6.3
Non-student unemployed 0.3 1.1 2.4 4.8 6.2 6.4 6.2 7.1 7.4 6.4 6.9 6.1 6.0 5.7 5.9 5.3
Non-student employed 1.3 2.5 6.2 20.3 27.7 35.8 41.6 46.2 54.0 62.8 67.7 70.9 71.8 74.6 75.3 44.1
University employed 0.0 0.0 0.5 5.9 10.7 12.7 14.2 13.5 9.7 8.3 5.2 4.2 4.3 3.9 2.9 6.5
University NILF1 0.0 0.0 1.0 10.9 13.9 14.8 13.8 12.1 8.7 5.9 4.6 2.9 2.6 1.9 1.7 6.4
College employed 0.0 0.0 5.8 13.5 16.5 13.0 10.4 8.1 6.9 4.5 3.4 3.8 2.8 2.2 3.0 6.5
College NILF1 1.1 1.5 5.4 9.2 10.1 7.8 6.6 5.4 5.4 3.5 2.8 2.3 2.5 2.0 2.0 4.5
Primary/secondary employed 24.6 38.3 39.7 17.1 4.4 1.9 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.5
Primary/secondary NILF1 70.0 53.3 35.9 13.8 4.9 1.5 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Statistics Canada. 2005. Education Indicators in Canada: Report of the Pan-Canadian Education Indicators Program. Catalogue no. 81-582-XIE. Ottawa.
Note: 1. NILF = Not in the labour force.
%
Age
 
As indicated in Table 1, the school-to-work 
transition starts at about the age of 16. For 
example, roughly 38.3 percent of 16 year olds 
were combining their studies with employment. 
In 2003-2004, the end of this transition 
appeared to occur at about age 23, with 54 
percent of young adults employed and not 
studying. In considering previous data from 
Statistics Canada, Bowlby (2000) indicated that 
this transitional period, while starting at about 
age 16 in the early 1980s, ended at about the age 
of 21 years (i.e., this transitional period was only 
about five years relative to about seven years in 
2003-2004). The Canadian labour market has 
changed noticeably over the last several 
decades, including important changes in the 
skills required for entrance-level jobs – 
explaining the rising propensity to pursue post-
secondary studies.  
With these changes, the likelihood of full-time 
employment actually declined among young 
men not studying, relative to earlier cohorts. 
Without an education, young adults have a 
particularly difficult time in establishing 
themselves, as the Canadian economy and 
occupational structure have moved into a “post-
industrial economic order” (Myles et al., 1993: 
171); Clement and Myles, 1994). This has 
involved a shift from manufacturing to an 
economic system based on the production of 
knowledge goods and personal services. 
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Education is fundamental in the adaptation to 
these changes, for the skill requirements of the 
typical job have increased over recent years 
(Baer, 1999; Bernard et al., 1997). 
Morissette (2002) documented how the 
proportion of male non-students aged 16-24 
working full time declined, from 77.6 percent in 
1981 to 69.1 percent by 2001 (see Table 2). 
Among women, a less pronounced decline 
occurred, from 61 to 56.3 percent. At ages 25-
29, there were again declines for men, from 88.1 
percent working full time in 1981 to 83.8 
percent in 2001. At this age group, women 
made significant gains, from 50.9 to 66.2 
percent working full time. Morissette (2002) 
also provided data on the declining earnings 
among young men, employed full time, full year, 
while female youth witnessed a general stability 
in earnings. The earnings of older men and 
women managed to increase somewhat while 
those of younger age groups either stagnated or 
declined – indicative of climbing inequalities 
across age groups. 
Other studies demonstrated how the proportion 
of youth working, the hours worked per week, 
and the wages per hour, all declined relative to 
older men (Morissette, 1998; Picot, 1998). The 
relative economic position of youth, particularly 
young men, declined throughout the 1980s and 
1990s, despite the fact that they had higher 
credentials in terms of education. The 
explanation for this decline is complex, as the 
Canadian work force has become more 
polarized by the unequal distribution of 
earnings and hours among workers of different 
age and skill levels. More recently, Morissette 
documented a modest reversal in these trends, 
as young adults fared slightly better in 2000 than 
they did five years earlier in 1995 (Table 2). For 
example, the percentage of full-time 
employment among male non-student youth  
16-24 bottomed out during the mid-1990s (at 
66.5 percent) before recovering somewhat 
according to the 2001 Census (up to 69.1 
percent). 
Table 2: Full-Time Employment and 
Earnings, 1976-2001 
 
 
Source: Morissette (2002). 
Other studies confirmed the disadvantage of 
younger men, especially in comparison to older 
men (Morissette, 1998; Picot, 1998). These 
disadvantages are relevant in explaining the 
timing of other fundamental life-cycle 
transitions, from home leaving to marriage and 
childbearing. Openheimer and Lewin (1999) 
argued that the transition to marriage depends 
on men’s earnings and their career mobility. 
Tanner and Yabiku (1999) concluded that the 
transition of contemporary youth to adulthood 
is not delayed because they have different goals, 
as the goal of a stable job remains dominant. 
Economic realities frustrate their achievement 
of these goals. Demographic realities may also 
play a role, as cohorts following the large baby 
boom generation have been disadvantaged 
(Beaujot and Kerr, 2004: 186-189). 
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Union Formation 
As with leaving home, completing school and 
entering the labour market, Canadian youth are 
also delaying union formation. The 
aforementioned downward pressure on 
earnings, particularly for young men, is often 
emphasized in explanation. However, the 
indeterminancy of these types of relationships 
complicates the understanding of the meaning 
and character of these sorts of transitions and 
how they have been changing over time. 
Common-law relationships have yet to be 
shaped by the same consensual norms or formal 
laws that now characterize the institution of 
marriage. The fluidity of union formation that 
includes not only marriage but also cohabitation 
is matched by the fluidity of other transitions, 
such as that of home leaving, with the greater 
predominance of returning home.  
There are delays in marriage and in union 
formation more generally. The median age at 
first marriage declined from 23.0 years for 
brides and 26.3 years for grooms in 1941, to just 
over 21 and 23 years respectively for those 
marrying in the early 1970s, then increased to 
median ages of 28.2 and 30.2 by 2001 (Beaujot 
and Kerr, 2004: 212). Part of the delay in 
marriage can be attributed to a larger proportion 
entering unions through cohabitation. For 
instance, 63 percent of first unions among 
women aged 20-29 in 2001 were common-law 
rather than marriages (Statistics Canada, 2002). 
Strong differences across the last several 
censuses occur in terms of the percentage in 
union, as both young men and women delay 
marriage and cohabitation. This is well 
represented in Figure 3, which portrays the 
percentage of youth either cohabiting or 
married by single years of age in 1991 and 2001, 
demonstrating this shift toward older ages. For 
example, the percentage of 25 year olds in union 
(married or cohabiting) was higher in 1991 than 
in 2001. Among young men, this percentage 
declined from about 38 percent to only 32 
percent; among young women, this percentage 
declined from about 55 to 46 percent.  
Common-law unions take on a variety of forms, 
from those that are the equivalent to marriage 
to those that might better be seen as an 
alternative to living single. For some couples, 
cohabitation continues to be largely viewed as 
merely a prelude to marriage, whereas for 
others, cohabitation has become almost 
indistinguishable from marriage (at least to the 
casual observer). As cohabitation has become 
widespread, various types of cohabiting unions 
co-exist, including those that involve less 
committed couples (Turcotte and Bélanger, 
1997). Some involve a day-to-day sharing of 
responsibilities and expenses, whereas others 
involve relatively little interdependence. Even 
further, in following the life course of specific 
individuals, it is obvious that the expectations 
and commitment that persons bring to their 
relationships may change in an important 
manner over time. For example, what begins as 
a convenient sharing of living expenses with 
very little commitment may very well evolve 
into a trial marriage, a setting for childbearing 
and eventually, into a relationship sanctioned by 
legal marriage itself (Seltzer, 2004). 
While common-law unions take on a variety of 
forms, from those that are the equivalent to 
marriage to those that might better be seen as 
an alternative to living single, two things are 
clear. First, common-law unions are twice as 
likely to end in separation as first marriages 
(Statistics Canada, 2002). Also, cohabitation 
postpones marriage and is correlated with lower 
marital stability. Wu (1999) proposed that 
cohabitation delays marriage not only because 
people who are marrying have a longer period 
of premarital relationships, but also because 
persons who cohabit are less likely to be 
searching actively for a marital partner, which 
further delays marriage timing if the relationship 
does not work out.  
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Figure 3: Percentage of Married or 
Cohabiting, by Age and Sex, 1991-2001 
 
Males 
 
Females 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, Public Use Files, 1991, 2001. 
Looking at the situation in the United States 
before 1980, Goldscheider and Waite (1986) 
suggested that men with more achieved status 
are more likely to “buy marriage” as part of the 
package, while women may use their higher 
education and occupational status to “buy out 
of marriage.” However, with most relationships 
taking the form of the two-worker model, 
achieved status has since come to increase the 
likelihood of marriage for both men and women 
(Goldscheider and Waite, 1991; Sweeney, 1997). 
Canadian results show a similar situation, 
implying shifting dynamics associated with 
forming relationships. Using the 1995 General 
Social Survey, Turcotte and Goldscheider 
(1998) found that more highly educated women 
from pre-1950 cohorts were less likely to marry, 
but the opposite applies in the post-1950 
cohorts. For men of both cohorts, education is 
positively related to entry into unions, but the 
relationship has declined in importance. Among 
more recent cohorts, uncertainties at work as 
measured through significant work interruptions 
reduce men’s likelihood of marriage, and they 
increase the likelihood that women will cohabit 
rather than marry.  
Given that union formation increasingly 
requires the earning power of both partners, we 
can expect to see an increased importance of 
education to women’s entry into marriage, while 
employment status becomes more important to 
entry into any type of union. In Quebec, where 
cohabitation is particularly high, women’s 
employment increases their likelihood of 
forming a common-law union (Bélanger and 
Turcotte, 1999). In their analysis, Turcotte and 
Goldscheider (1998) found that working has 
become more important for entering any kind 
of union, since union formation increasingly 
requires the earning power of both partners. 
Thus, the labour market disadvantages of young 
men reduce union formation, while young 
women have become more aware of the labour 
market disadvantages of early parenthood. 
Oppenheimer (1988) did not attribute the delay 
of marriage to fewer gains associated with 
marriage, nor to an independence hypothesis 
wherein women with more status would use 
that status to remain more independent. 
Instead, Oppenheimer (1988, 1997) attributed 
the delay to the difficulty young men have had 
in establishing their work lives, and to the 
importance attached to the work lives of both 
spouses. That is, young adults will search longer 
for a spouse if there is a longer period of 
uncertainty before their economic future is 
defined.  
Besides these economic questions, marriage 
may pose a different priority for young people. 
In “Sure, I’d Like to Get Married ... Someday,” 
White (1999: 57) suggested that there is a  
 17 
 “worldwide retreat from marriage,” as men 
know that marriage requires greater 
commitment to a stable work life, and as 
women know they cannot depend on the 
stability of the union. However, survey evidence 
would suggest that young people attach much 
importance to living in a stable relationship 
(Lapierre-Adamcyk, 1990). Attitudes and values 
clearly play a role in the entry into cohabitations 
and marriages, but these attitudes indicate 
strong expectations and preferences to enter 
relationships (Milan, 2003). That is, the delay 
would not be associated with a retreat from 
relationships, but rather with the complexity of 
achieving two rewarding jobs and a stable 
relationship. 
First Childbirth 
While there is a certain fluidity to home leaving 
and union formation, making the transition 
difficult to mark, the same does not apply to the 
transition to parenthood, especially for women. 
The transition to parenthood involves much  
 
Figure 4: Fertility Rate by Age Group, 1972-2003  
 
                    Source: Bélanger (2005). 
change in people’s lives, and is highly significant 
because of the associated permanence and 
obligation. One can have ex-spouses and ex-
jobs but not ex-children. Even for men, 
parenthood is one of the most permanent 
commitments (Rindfuss et al., 1988).  
The delay in childbearing has brought 
reductions in fertility; the average age of women 
at first birth, increased from about 23 in 1976 to 
at least 28 by 2003 (Lochhead, 2000; Bélanger, 
2005). In 1976, only nine percent of first-time 
mothers were aged 30 or more, but this applied 
to more than 35 percent by 2003. Over cohorts, 
the median age of men at their first birth was 
26.5 in the 1941-45 birth cohort, compared to 
31.2 in the 1961-65 cohort (Beaujot, 2000: 97). 
For women, this median age increased from 
23.3 in the 1941-45 cohort to 27.8 in the    
1966-70 cohort.  
The delay in childbearing can also be seen in 
available time series on age-specific fertility rates 
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(see Figure 4). Over the last 30 years, the most 
pronounced decline in age-specific fertility 
occurred among women aged 20-24, which 
declined from about 120 births per 1,000 
women in 1973 to only 52.7 births per 1,000 
women by 2003. Throughout this period, 
fertility rates declined consistently for women 
under the age of 30, whereas fertility rose for 
women in their 30s, and remained relatively 
stable for women in their 40s. Fertility rates at 
ages 15-19, 20-24 and, to a lesser extent, 25-29 
recently declined to their lowest level in 
decades. During the 1960s, the age group 20-24 
actually had the highest fertility rate in Canada, 
but it has since been bypassed by age group 25-
29. On the other hand, since the mid-1970s, 
fertility has increased among women in their 
30s. This trend toward older women having 
children breaks with the long-term trends 
associated with the first demographic transition, 
where fertility declined first among older 
women and, in particular, among women over 
35.  
The delay in childbearing can also be seen in the 
reductions in fertility for women aged 15-19, 
across a number of countries (Teitler, 2002: 
142). There are also important variations, with 
Canada’s rate being significantly lower than that 
of the United States, but similar to the United 
Kingdom, New Zealand and Australia, and 
higher than that of many European countries. 
For instance, the birth rate at ages 15-19 is close 
to 5 per 1,000 women in the Netherlands and 
Sweden, compared to 16 in Canada and 49 in 
the United States. The Canadian rates declined 
from 34.0 births per 1,000 women in 1976. This 
is not a function of delays in the age of first 
intercourse, which has been declining for both 
sexes, reaching a median age of about 16 to 17 
years (Teitler, 2002: 136). In the Canadian case, 
about half of conceptions to teenagers are 
aborted (Dryburgh, 2000).  
The changed age pattern of childbearing, or the 
delay of fertility, has largely been associated with 
women’s increased education and labour force 
participation. Particularly in the period 1963-
1989, Rindfuss and his colleagues (1996) 
observed that women with a college education 
experienced dramatic shifts toward later ages at 
childbearing. Looking at variations in the length 
of male parenting, Ravanera and Rajulton 
(2000) found that men of higher status start 
later and finish sooner. Lochhead (2000: 42) 
observed that the distribution of first births 
shifts further to higher ages for women who 
have more education. He pointed especially to 
powerful economic and career incentives to 
delay childbirth and family formation, for many 
young women and men. Looking at the 
transition to adulthood in aging societies, 
Fussell (2002) attributed both later and less 
childbearing to more insecurities for men and 
more labour force participation for women.  
However, these economic relationships are not 
always simple. For instance, Smith (1999) 
observed that on some questions, such as the 
contractual protection of employees, insecurity 
has been reduced. What may have especially 
increased is people’s aversion to risk (Hall, 
2002). It has also become much more 
acceptable to refer to a lack of security as the 
reason for not having children. Just as there is 
not a simple relationship between economic 
security and childbearing trends, the relation 
between fertility and labour force participation 
is not straightforward. We often pay attention 
to the period 1960 to 1975 when there were 
clearly reductions in fertility and increases in 
women’s labour force participation (Beaujot and 
Kerr, 2004: 87). However, women’s education 
and labour force participation were increasing in 
the 1950s, when fertility was also rising. The 
period since 1975 has seen reasonably stable 
fertility but continued increases in labour force 
participation.  
The relationship between labour force 
participation and childbearing probably involves 
two models. In a model that was more relevant 
to older cohorts, women with less labour 
market integration were more likely to have 
children. However, in younger cohorts, women 
may delay childbearing until they are better 
integrated in the labour force and, consequently, 
it would be the women who are better 
 19 
integrated in the labour market who would be 
having children. This model is encouraged by 
provisions for parental leave and child care, 
which are not oriented to women who are not 
employed. Certain occupations are more 
conducive to the second model, with women in 
education or nursing having more flexibility to 
have a child compared to those in law or 
engineering. In a qualitative study based on 
women who graduated from university in 1985, 
Ranson (1998) found that those in education 
could take advantage of leaves, and guaranteed 
return to their employment, while women in law 
or business found they had to concentrate on 
their careers to the point that they had put off 
childbearing. 
For women, data from the 1998 Survey of 
Labour and Income Dynamics suggest that the 
economic advantages associated with delaying 
parenthood have increased for younger 
generations of mothers (Drolet, 2002). This 
study found no significant association between 
the timing of marriage and wages, but the 
timing of parenthood does make a difference 
for women’s wages. Controlling for other 
things, the wages of women who had their 
children later did not differ from those who had 
no children, but women who had their children 
earlier than the average for their level of 
education had lower average wages. Women 
who delayed their births had accumulated more 
years of full-time work experience (Drolet, 
2003).  
Lone Parenthood 
Family life among Canadians constantly 
changes, as influenced by the aforementioned 
trends in union formation and childbearing. 
Since the 1970s, the prevalence of lone 
parenthood has risen, as shaped by recent 
trends in cohabitation (which is less stable than 
marriage, even with the presence of children), 
non-marital fertility, divorce, and separation. 
For example, in considering recent census data, 
the proportion of all families with children who 
involve a lone parent increased from one in five 
families in 1991 (20 percent) to about one in 
four families by 2001 (24.7 percent). Yet the 
proportion of all such families that involve 
young mothers simultaneously declined, largely 
consistent with recent trends in delayed 
childbearing. 
Whereas 9.9 percent of all lone-parent families 
involved a parent under the age of 25 in 1991, 
this fell to about 7.1 percent by 2001. Among all 
female lone parents the proportion where the 
mother is under the age of 29, dropped from 
about one in four families in 1991 (24.4 percent) 
to fewer than one in five by 2002 (18.3 percent). 
Teenage fertility has fallen to unprecedented 
lows in Canada, as has fertility among women in 
their early 20s, particularly if they are without a 
partner. As the timing of parenthood can have a 
major impact on the life chances of the young, 
an increasing proportion of young women are 
in a position to act accordingly. As a result, 
many pregnancies to young women in Canada 
are aborted; for every 100 live births to 
teenagers in Canada, aged 15-19 in 2003, there 
was a reported 120 abortions. For young 
women without partners, these ratios are even 
higher. 
Lone-parent families headed by women are 
among the most economically vulnerable in 
Canada, as is true in several other developed 
societies. For example, using Statistics Canada’s 
low-income cutoffs, Myles et al. (2006) 
documented a low-income rate of about 48 
percent in 2000. Yet in charting low-income 
rates over recent censuses, this low-income rate 
has actually fallen from about 56 percent at the 
time of the 1991 Census. Rising education and 
employment levels among lone parents has had 
a noticeable impact on the economic resources 
available to them, as labour force participation 
rates have risen, particularly during the 
economic recovery of the latter 1990s. 
Nonetheless, for young mothers, Myles et al. 
(2006) documented little change in their 
economic circumstances, despite the gains made 
by older women.  
Low-income rates among lone parents under 30 
have remained virtually unchanged over recent 
years. Consistent with trends in the labour 
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market as a whole, returns for younger mothers, 
as indexed by weekly earnings, have actually 
declined, after making adjustments for changes 
in the cost of living. Despite rising education 
and employment levels, low-income rates have 
remained virtually unchanged. The good news is 
a declining proportion of lone-parent families 
involve particularly young mothers. The bad 
news is that for women who continue to have 
children at a relatively young age, there is a very 
high likelihood of economic hardship for both 
themselves and their children. 
4. Immigrant and Aboriginal 
 Youth 
The aforementioned transitions (leaving home, 
completing one’s education and entering the 
labour force, establishing a union and having a 
first child) continue to work well for most 
young adults, albeit at a somewhat delayed age. 
While there are obviously important exceptions 
to this generalization, as for example, the 
difficulties experienced by young lone mothers, 
the majority of youth appear to do reasonably 
well as they move into adult roles. Somewhat 
problematic is the fact that the relative earnings 
of young people have fallen behind that of older 
cohorts, consistent with the idea that there is 
climbing social inequality across age groups in 
Canada. Yet despite this fact, there are reasons 
for optimism, particularly given the major gains 
that have characterized youth in terms of post-
secondary education and the fact that the large 
baby boom generation is starting to retire from 
the labour force. 
With this in mind, it is useful to return to a 
fundamental research issue raised by the PRI 
(2006): whether it is possible to identify some of 
the drivers and impacts on vulnerable youth 
populations. In this context, we briefly consider 
many of the aforementioned transitions while 
specifically considering the experience of 
immigrant youth as well as Aboriginal youth. 
These two population groups have been 
identified as being particularly vulnerable to 
economic hardship and persistent low income 
(Hatfield, 2005). The difficult living conditions 
of the Aboriginal population have been well 
documented, as many of Canada’s First Nations 
have never shared equally in the affluence of 
Canadian society (Frideres and Gadacz, 2001; 
Ponting, 1997). With regard to immigration, 
while historically immigrants have done 
relatively well (after an initial period of 
adjustment), more recently this has been much 
less the case; immigrants have faced greater 
difficulties, that is, lower rates of employment 
and earnings, and higher rates of income 
poverty (Reitz, 2001; Li, 2003; Picot and 
Sweetman, 2005). 
The economic disadvantages of these 
population groups may be linked either directly 
or indirectly to family and life-cycle questions. 
As aforementioned, establishing an independent 
residence is largely seen as a critical step in the 
transition to adulthood, in marking a shift from 
some forms of dependence to greater economic 
autonomy. Figure 5 portrays the percentage 
living with parents by age, for the immigrant 
population (i.e., exclusively foreign-born youth), 
Aboriginal Canadians, and for comparative 
purposes, all Canadians regardless of ancestry or 
immigration status. In considering the 
Aboriginal population, Figure 5 uses the 
“Aboriginal identity” population in the 2001 
Census, which includes registered Indians, non-
status Indians, the Métis and Inuit (who self-
identify). In considering the immigrant 
population, Figure 5 does not include second-
generation Canadians born in Canada to 
persons foreign born. 
Figure 5 portrays a pattern that is fundamental 
to many of the transitions considered in the 
current context, that is, Aboriginal youth are not 
nearly as likely to delay these transitions. (In this 
case, they are much more likely to move out of 
their parent’s home at a relatively young age.) 
On the other hand, the opposite pattern is 
observed among immigrants, as they are much 
more likely to delay this transition relative to 
both the Canadian-born as well as the 
Aboriginal population. For example, among 
youth aged 20, fully 84.6 percent of immigrant 
youth report living with their parents, which 
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compares with 75.8 percent of Canadian youth 
in general, and only about one half of 
Aboriginal youth in 2001 (55.7 percent). These 
differences in home leaving patterns are quite 
pronounced, suggesting that the paths of 
Aboriginal and immigrant youth in establishing 
adult roles differ quite noticeably from that of 
other Canadians.  
Figure 5: Percentage Living with 
Parents by Age, Canada, 2001  
 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, Public Use Files, 2001 Canadian 
Census. 
Different factors likely play out here, depending 
on whether we focus on Aboriginal or 
immigrant youth. An obvious question with 
regard to immigrant youth is whether this delay 
in leaving home is a deliberate strategy allowing 
them to invest longer in themselves, or 
alternatively, the by-product of obstacles faced 
in establishing themselves in independent 
households. By delaying home leaving, it is 
possible to profit longer from transfers from 
parents, both in terms of their financial and 
human capital. On the other hand, among 
Aboriginal youth, the obvious question that 
surfaces is related; that is, the extent to which 
Aboriginal youth experience the opposite 
situation, losing out in terms of these transfers, 
given their propensity to leave their parents 
home as teenagers. In certain contexts, early 
home leaving has been linked with lower 
educational attainment and less successful 
career patterns, as the young are less capable in 
meeting the demands of both education and 
employment. The differences are quite striking 
in comparing these populations, as for example, 
fully one in five Aboriginal youth aged 18 had 
already moved out of their parent’s home, 
which compares with only one in fourteen 
among immigrants.  
Figure 6 portrays the percentage studying full 
time, again by age for these three distinct 
population groups. As was the case with home 
leaving, Aboriginal Canadians leave their studies 
at a significantly younger age than is true for 
other Canadians, whereas immigrant youth are 
more likely to continue with their education. 
For example, by age 18 less than half of 
Aboriginal youth report studying full time   
(49.4 percent), which compares with 67.5 
percent of Canadians overall and 78.9 per cent 
of immigrant youth. Aboriginal youth are far 
less likely to complete their high school relative 
to other Canadian youth, a problem which is 
particularly acute with registered Indians and 
the Inuit. Beavon and Guimond (2006) 
provided statistics from the 2001 Census 
suggesting that up to one half of all youth who 
are registered Indians in Canada fail to obtain 
their high school certificate. On the other hand, 
immigrant youth are slightly more likely than 
the Canadian born to obtain post-secondary 
education, which is consistent with the selective 
nature of Canada’s immigration policy and the 
levels of education among immigrants.  
Figure 6: Percentage Studying Full 
Time by Age, Canada, 2001  
 
Source: Statistics Canada, Public Use Files, 2001 Canadian 
Census. 
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Figure 7 portrays the percentage working full 
time, again by age and for these three distinct 
population groups, suggesting that the transition 
from school into the labour market also varies 
noticeably. Consistent with expectations, given 
that Aboriginal youth are more likely to leave 
school early, they are also more likely to work 
full time as adolescents. Also consistent with the 
data on home leaving and education, immigrant 
youth show lower participation rates in the 
labour force across all ages, suggesting delays in 
making the school-to-work transition. As this 
subpopulation of youth includes both recent 
immigrants as well as those who have been in 
Canada for many years, the educational 
qualifications (Canadian versus foreign trained) 
and linguistic abilities (fluency in English 
and/or French) varies considerably which, in 
turn, may at least partially explain some 
differences. New immigrants to Canada are 
more likely to experience unemployment 
and/or relatively low wages in obtaining a job, 
despite being better educated than other 
Canadians.  
To the extent that immigrant youth obtain their 
education in Canada, they can expect stronger 
economic value for this education (Hum and 
Simpson, 1999). Richmond (1989) pointed out 
long ago that many of the social costs of 
immigration are born by immigrants themselves: 
housing problems, language barriers, non-
recognition of credentials, experience of racial 
prejudice and discrimination, and frustrated 
expectations for upward mobility. Among First 
Nations in Canada, there are similar dynamics at 
play in terms of discrimination and frustrated 
expectations for upward mobility. Yet many 
Aboriginal youth face economic obstacles due 
to the geographic and economic isolation of 
many First Nations communities and reserves, 
often in economically depressed and less 
developed regions of the country. While 
Aboriginal youth are more likely to work full 
time as teenagers relative to other Canadians, as 
they move into their 20s they become 
significantly less likely to be employed full time. 
 
Figure 7: Percentage Working Full Time 
by Age, Canada, 2001  
 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, Public Use Files, 2001 Canadian 
Census. 
As there are significant differences in terms of 
home leaving and the school-to-work transition, 
so too there are somewhat predictable 
differences documented in terms of marriage, 
cohabitation, and childbearing (see Table 3). As 
Aboriginal youth are considerably more likely to 
finish school and leave their parent’s home at a 
relatively young age, so too they are more likely 
to form a union or have a first child. By the age 
of 20, fully 20.6 percent of Aboriginal youth 
report cohabiting or being married, which 
compares with only 8.8 percent among 
Canadians in general and 6.3 percent among 
immigrants. As an indicator of differences in 
fertility by age, Table 3 also provides 
information on the percentage of women who 
report living with at least one child under the 
age of 5. In this regard, some differences are 
striking; as for example, by age 20, fully 27.1 
percent of Aboriginal youth report living with a 
child under the age of 5, which compares with 
only 3.9 percent of immigrants and 5.8 percent 
of all Canadians.  
The fertility outcomes of Aboriginal Canadians 
continue to be quite distinct, particularly among 
the Inuit and Status Indians, and to a lesser 
extent, among non-Status Indians and the Métis 
(Norris, 2000; Romaniuc, 2000). Aboriginal 
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peoples in Canada begin childbearing at a 
younger age than other Canadians, have higher 
completed fertility, a high rate of natural 
increase and, consequently, an age structure that 
is considerably younger than that of other 
Canadians. Immigrants to Canada, on the other 
hand, have fertility outcomes that do not differ 
dramatically from other Canadians, despite 
some widely held myths that assumed that 
immigrants have particularly large families with 
many children. If anything, Table 3 suggests 
that there is a slight propensity among new 
Canadians to delay first births, as the proportion 
of women under 30 living with a child aged 
under 5 is consistently lower than in the other 
population groups. Malenfant and Bélanger 
(2006) documented a tendency for fertility 
behaviour of immigrants to converge toward 
Canadian norms, particularly among women 
who immigrated before the age of 15, and who 
therefore received part of their education in 
Canada. Again, this delay may reflect a 
combination of factors, as new immigrants to 
Canada face, on average, greater obstacles in 
establishing themselves, a situation that appears 
to have worsened recently. Yet more generally, 
it does make sense that immigrant youth delay 
both unions and childbearing in this context, 
Table 3: Percentage who are Married or Cohabitating 
Age All Canadians Immigrants Aboriginal Identity 
15 0.1 0.3 0.4 
16 0.3 0.5 1.5 
17 0.8 0.9 3.0 
18 2.1 1.4 6.7 
19 4.7 4.2 11.2 
20 8.8 6.3 20.6 
21 13.5 9.0 23.3 
22 18.6 15.3 29.3 
23 25.7 20.5 35.8 
24 32.4 28.1 42.3 
25 39.2 36.1 46.4 
26 45.2 39.1 45.7 
27 51.8 49.5 52.2 
28 55.9 54.0 53.6 
29 60.5 60.0 57.0 
 
Percentage of Women with at Least One Child Aged Five or Under 
Age All Canadians Immigrants Aboriginal Identity 
15 0.3 0.3 1.1 
16 0.3 0.3 3.0 
17 1.0 0.9 5.6 
18 1.9 1.5 9.5 
19 3.5 2.6 18.5 
20 5.8 3.9 27.1 
21 8.3 6.6 33.9 
22 10.5 8.3 32.6 
23 15.6 13.2 38.1 
24 20.2 18.9 40.6 
25 23.1 22.2 41.5 
26 26.3 24.1 33.6 
27 30.2 30.4 36.5 
28 33.3 32.5 35.6 
29 35.4 36.6 37.5 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, Public Use Files, Canadian Census, 1991, 2001. 
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while investing in their education, as there is 
considerable economic uncertainty in the  
Canadian economy and a climbing demand for 
advanced skills. To the extent that time is spent 
in acquiring more education and skills before 
getting married or having children, then one can 
well argue that there are more benefits than 
costs. 
5. Consequences of Delayed 
 Life Transitions 
In reviewing past research published on 
Canadian youth, there is much more on the 
causes of the delay in early life transitions than 
the consequences. Perhaps an important factor 
responsible for this is that the scientific method 
is better suited for deciphering causes than 
outlining possible consequences. Discussions of 
consequences often become quite speculative, 
and thus driven by the basic values of the 
investigator. A discussion of future 
consequences of current change is inherently 
approximate and does not easily lend itself to 
the scientific method. Even the Scientific Panel 
on Transitions to Adulthood of the 
International Union on the Scientific Study of 
Population tends to shy away from looking at 
implications.  
One approach to the study of consequences 
using the scientific method is to choose a given 
implication and examine the possible 
determinants of that specific consideration. For 
example, consider the concern by some that the 
tendency among young adults to delay early life 
transitions may lead them to earn much less in 
terms of lifetime earnings, and subsequently 
have less accumulated investments by the time 
they retire, usually by age 65. In this context, 
one could attempt to approach this issue 
scientifically by studying the determinants of 
accumulated investments by age 65, including 
the impact of late transitions among other 
considerations. Morissette (2002) conducted 
research that is similar yet perhaps more 
manageable in the current context, by 
examining the impact of late transitions on 
cumulative earnings to ages 26-35 rather than 
retirement age. Very briefly, he found clear and 
decisive evidence of deteriorating cumulative 
earnings, as associated with some of the more 
fundamental trends already highlighted in the 
current report, including higher proportions 
attending school full time as well as lower 
proportions of non-student men working full 
time, and declines in men’s earnings. Yet as to 
the longer term implications of these delays, 
particularly in terms of investments by age 65, 
there is obviously much uncertainty as to the 
future earnings of these younger cohorts, 
particularly given that many young people have 
invested heavily in education.  
From the political economy perspective, the 
main reason for late transitions must be that 
youth lack opportunities. Yet this view is 
undermined by the observation that some 
population groups that also lack opportunities 
react by rushing rather than delaying these same 
transitions. As an example, consider the two 
vulnerable populations as discussed in the 
previous section: Aboriginal peoples in Canada, 
who appear to be particularly rushed, and 
immigrants to Canada, who are more likely to 
delay. In turn, while late transitions may pose 
certain disadvantages at the aggregate level, the 
same may also be true in terms of early 
transitions.  
According to Kaplan’s theory of the life course, 
the timing of transitions involves trade-offs. 
Late transitions in this conception would 
promote greater quality of children, but it may 
mean no children, particularly as fecundity 
declines with age. Waiting longer to reproduce 
allows greater investment in oneself before 
investing in reproduction; thus, it allows one to 
invest more in one’s offspring. But delay may 
mean that reproduction never occurs. 
Considering the broader societal context, 
Canada has been witnessing unprecedented low 
fertility, with Canada’s total fertility rate 
hovering at only about 1.5 births per woman. 
Annual births in Canada have steadily fallen for 
well over a decade: down almost 20 percent, 
from about 403,280 in 1989 to 327,187 in 2001 
(Statistics Canada, 2003). The last time Canada 
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recorded so few births was over 60 years ago, as 
the number of births was below the 320,000 
mark back in the early 1940s. 
Later transitions enable more transfers from 
parents to children, but this may reduce the 
potential for the parents to invest in their own 
retirement. That is, persons making later 
transitions are likely to benefit from more 
parental and community resources, and thus 
enter work life later but better equipped. It 
remains an empirical question to determine if 
they have sufficient time in their lives to benefit 
fully from this stronger human capital. Yet 
again, some population groups are particularly 
disadvantaged, while simultaneously rushing 
rather than delaying these same transitions. In 
reference to disadvantaged populations in the 
United States, Goldscheider and Goldscheider 
(1999: 209-210) pointed out that leaving home 
at a very young age, particularly when this does 
not involve attending school, has a variety of 
negative consequences for establishing 
successful career patterns and stable families. 
Co-residence provides greater subsidies than are 
provided through financial support for 
independent living. In this regard, then, recent 
trends toward delay in the Canadian context can 
be considered advantageous. 
Bernhardt (1999) and her colleagues further 
summarized that leaving home early can pose 
problems for completing high school, 
establishing savings, and testing new 
relationships. It is also linked to lower 
educational aspirations and attainment. In turn, 
youth from more affluent families are more 
likely to leave home to further their education, 
more likely to delay their career paths, and less 
likely to enter unstable relationships, such as 
cohabitation and early marriages. In contrast, 
parental family structures that are not intact, 
such as lone-parent families and step-families, 
lead to early home leaving, the early formation 
of relationships, and decreased investment in 
education (Bernhardt et al., 2003). With this in 
mind, it is noted that Aboriginal youth are much 
more likely to live in lone-parent families, just as 
they are more likely to be part of a step-family, 
as economic resources are often scarce and 
housing conditions poor. As demonstrated in 
the previous section, Aboriginal youth are also 
noted for their particularly early transitions in 
establishing their own households and 
relationships, and are noted for having much 
higher levels of teenage fertility and childbearing 
early into adulthood. 
The implications of delayed life transitions for 
adolescents and youth depend critically on the 
extent to which the extra time is used to 
accumulate human and financial capital. Among 
persons with low skills, there is some evidence 
in the United States that the rotation across jobs 
is not building their human capital (Klerman 
and Karoly, 1994). In earlier times, young men 
with limited education would largely be married 
parents and they would need to stay with their 
job. But if the instability in employment is 
better interpreted as “churn” rather than the 
acquisition of human capital through mobility 
across jobs, then their time is wasted rather than 
being used productively. Without the pressure 
of marriage and parenthood, some young 
people seem to spend a lot of time “deciding” 
how they want to face adult life. It can be 
argued that delayed home leaving and late entry 
into full-time work means a delay in 
participation in society as a full citizen.  
If time is spent acquiring more education and 
skills, or getting established before having 
children, then one can well argue that there are 
more benefits than costs. However, this 
argument is based on the experience of past 
cohorts, which may not apply to the future. A 
much larger proportion of youth continue with 
post-secondary education, such that it has 
become the norm that young adults attempt to 
obtain a college and/or university education. In 
particular, those who delayed among older 
generations were very selective, typically 
spending considerable time and energy in 
obtaining an education that was arguably of 
higher standards (Côté and Allahar, 2007). To 
the extent that this investment has paid off, they 
are likely to have benefited from their delays 
relative to others in their cohort. This is not 
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necessarily going to be the case in the future, as 
college or university credentials become more 
widespread. As aforementioned, there is already 
considerable evidence of underemployment 
among university graduates in Canada today. 
In asking people about the best time to have 
children, a certain number of people say that 
one should not wait too long, to have the 
necessary energy and patience, and to minimize 
the gap between parents and children. 
Observing that later childbearing is more likely 
to involve a first child or an only child, Marcil-
Gratton (1988) noted that the parents are more 
likely to be inexperienced at taking care of 
children, and the child is less likely to have the 
advantage of an older brother or sister from 
whom one can learn. While only children also 
have advantages, such as the undivided 
attention of parents, respondents in a qualitative 
survey often mentioned the concern of not 
having lived in a close interpersonal 
environment with someone of one’s own age, 
which could be important to establishing marital 
relationships (Beaujot and Bélanger, 2001). 
From the point of view of young children, 
delayed childbearing comes with the advantages 
of parents who are more mature, with more 
financial and human capital, but with the 
possible disadvantages of less sibling 
interaction, and a larger age gap with their 
parents. 
Given that the delay in parenting has permitted 
more education, Lochhead (2000) found 
increasing socio-economic disparities between 
younger and older parents. More specifically, 
Lochhead documented some evidence of 
increased polarization of opportunities and 
results between the majority of young people 
who postpone major life transitions (and in 
particular, the birth of a first child) relative to 
those who choose a “fast track.” Some authors 
have specifically spoken of a bifurcation of 
models in terms of early and late childbearing. 
Based on census data, Lochhead (2000) found 
that delayed childbearing is more pronounced 
among women who have a university education, 
and there are increasing income differentials to 
the disadvantage of younger first-time mothers, 
even in two-parent families. Using data from 
the United States, Martin (2000) noted that 
delayed childbearers, who tend to have more 
education, are increasingly likely to raise their 
children in intact marriages, while early 
childbearers are more likely to raise children 
outside of marriage. Canadian data also indicate 
that women under 30 who are formerly married 
are much more likely to have children than 
those who are single, cohabiting, or married 
(Ravanera, 1995: 18).  
Some selective evidence from the Canadian 
Census (comparing 1991 with 2001) provides 
similar evidence that there are climbing 
disparities between young adults who are on the 
“fast track” relative to those who delay a first 
birth. Figures 8 and 9 portray this quite well, by 
focusing exclusively on women who report 
having at least one child under the age of 5. 
Systematic comparisons are made between 
mothers aged 20-24 and those aged 25-29, in 
1991 and 2001 respectively. Figure 8 shows the 
percentage of women with young children  
(aged 0-5) employed full time in 1991 and in 
2001, showing that the women who delay 
childbearing are more likely to be employed, in 
both censuses. Yet consistent with this idea of 
an increased bifurcation of conditions, the 
differences as observed between the two age 
groups in 2001 were greater than in 1991. For 
example, in 1991, 41.5 percent of all women 
aged 20-24 and 47.7 percent of women aged 25-
29 were working full time, which shifted to 38.4 
and 50.5 percent respectively, in 2001. In other 
words, older women were more likely to be 
working in 2001, whereas younger women were 
less likely. 
Figure 9 provides similar comparisons, yet 
shifting attention to the percentage of women 
who report raising children alone as lone 
parents. While 24.5 percent of the younger 
mothers (aged 20-24) were raising children 
alone in 1991, this climbed to 36.8 percent by 
2001. The corresponding change as observed 
for older women was not nearly as pronounced, 
shifting from 12.7 percent in 1991 to 16.2 
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percent by 2001. A similar situation, with 
widening disparities, was observed with other 
fundamental census variables, such as 
education, low income, and median income. 
While a declining proportion of all women have 
their first birth before the age of 25 years, those 
who continue to do so appear to be increasingly 
selective and disadvantaged on several 
dimensions. Although not presented here, 
similar patterns were also observed for young 
fathers on this “fast track.” 
Figure 8: Percentage of Women with 
Child 0-5 Who Are Working Full Time, 
1991, 2001 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, Public Use File, Canadian 
Census, 1991, 2001. 
Documenting similar trends in the United 
States, Bianchi (2000) noted a bifurcation of 
models, as young families seem to be 
increasingly disadvantaged relative to families 
established by parents who have delayed 
marriage and first birth. As a result, children are 
a differential parental investment. Children born 
from mature parents are more likely to have the 
advantages of a mother with more human 
capital, along with the presence of a father in a 
dual-income family, which contrasts with the 
greater likelihood of lone parenthood for those 
who parent early. Most studies see advantages 
for individuals who delay, relative to the 
remainder of their cohort. In their study of early 
life transitions of Canadians, Ravanera and her 
colleagues (1998, 2002) found that the delay in 
family formation is more likely to occur for 
persons with more opportunities. For instance, 
the timing of first marriage is later for women 
who worked before marriage, for those with 
more education, and for those whose mother 
had more education.  
It is particularly important that gender questions 
be properly theorized in interpreting the 
consequences of delayed transitions. As 
repeatedly documented, younger men in 
particular do poorly in the labour market 
compared to men of previous generations. For 
younger women, it is their education that has 
particularly advanced, and once they are in the 
labour market, they do well compared to 
women of earlier generations. Yet relative to 
younger men, younger women continue to 
experience lower earnings and a higher 
likelihood of economic hardship, at least 
partially related to the fact that they are more 
likely to raise children alone. Clearly, men and 
women are not independent of each other, 
neither in the labour market nor in families. In 
the labour market, young men have had the 
disadvantage of following the baby boom 
cohort who took the best jobs and of having to 
compete with well-educated women (Beaujot, 
2002). At the level of couples, most now adopt 
the two-worker model, and thus women’s gains 
compensate for men’s losses. Given women’s 
greater contributions to earnings, it may even be 
that men do not need to devote themselves as 
fully to maximizing their own earnings, and they 
can do a greater share of the caring side of 
maintaining a family. Young men and women 
who enter into conjugal relationships in which 
both partners are employed have various 
advantages. Besides being based on later 
marriage, the two-worker model is based on 
later childbearing. The cost of children is more 
likely to be shared if children arrive after the 
wife’s career is established. The husband in the 
two-earner model will better recognize his 
partner’s economic potential, and be more 
willing to make accommodations. The same 
may apply to the workplace, which is more 
likely to make accommodations for the 
childbearing of workers who have more 
seniority.  
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Figure 9: Percentage of Women with 
Child 0-5 Who Are Lone Parents, 1991, 
2001  
 
Source: Statistics Canada, Public Use File, Canadian 
Census, 1991, 2001. 
As aforementioned, the broader context for 
these delayed transitions has been the so-called 
second demographic transition (Lesthaeghe, 
1995), which has meant greater plurality and 
diversity in the family life of Canadians. As with 
these delayed transitions, the second 
demographic transition has had important 
implications for women, men, and children, 
some for the better and some for the worse. For 
women, it has meant major gains in education 
and opportunities in the labour force; however, 
the increased instability of relationships means 
that, compared to men, they are more likely to 
raise children alone. That is, they are less likely 
to have the support of a partner, and are more 
likely to care for dependent children. On the 
other hand, while men are delaying 
relationships, marriage and childbearing, they 
are also less likely to have lifelong relationships 
of emotional exchange with their children. For 
children, it means older parents yet less stability 
in parenting. Regardless of the delay transitions 
of young Canadians, many of these additional 
transformations in family life have some rather 
important consequences on the well-being of 
young and old alike.  
Fertility is down to an unprecedented low in 
Canada, as childbearing occurs at older ages. 
This is perhaps the core feature of the second 
demographic transition, which includes new 
understandings regarding family relationships, 
with more focus on self-centred fulfillment and 
greater flexibility in the entry and exit from 
unions. Given the need for both men and 
women to be economically independent, it 
makes sense that unions and childbearing are 
delayed as education is completed and work 
lives established. Given the economic 
uncertainty and the needs for advanced skills, it 
also makes sense that people are longer in 
education, and later in starting their first full-
time employment. The economic uncertainties 
faced by men, partly because they compete with 
equally educated women, have brought delays in 
union formation. The uncertainties in men’s 
work lives, and the stronger labour force 
participation of women, have made it difficult 
to fit children into busy lives, thus bringing 
delays in reproduction and higher proportions 
without children. With the focus on self-centred 
fulfillment, there is less attention to the 
enduring fulfillment that comes from children 
and family.  
With this, perhaps the strongest negative at the 
societal level is lower fertility and the resultant 
population aging, which is expected, inevitably, 
to escalate as we move further into the 21st 
century. Accommodations to population aging 
will be complex, and will in all likelihood be one 
of the most fundamental societal challenges 
over the next several decades. Population aging 
affects a number of policy questions ranging 
from pensions and other transfers, through to 
health care and labour market issues. As 
Canadian youth avoid and delay fundamental 
adult transitions well into their later 20s and 
into their early 30s, a growing proportion either 
intentionally or non-intentionally have less than 
desired fertility, contributing to a major 
contraction occurring at the bottom of Canada’s 
age structure. This contraction, without a major 
rebound in the fertility rate, can only contribute 
to an acceleration in the pace of population 
aging. 
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6. Conclusion and Policy 
 Implications 
Various social, demographic, and economic 
changes have altered the life experience of the 
young, which has modified the opportunities 
and risks encountered in moving toward 
adulthood. The objective of this report was to 
describe some of the most salient of these 
changes, with a review of existing Canadian 
literature. Of particular interest were some of 
the most fundamental changes in the life course, 
in terms of later home leaving, later completion 
of education, delayed full-time entrance into the 
labour force, later union formation, and later 
childbearing. Correspondingly, we were also 
interested in some of the consequences of these 
changes, including policy implications. 
The delays as observed over the last several 
decades are in marked contrast to the situation 
observed earlier, where transitions were 
occurring at increasingly younger average ages. 
In particular, cohorts that came of age during 
the 1950s and 1960s in Canada experienced a 
transition to adulthood that was much more 
compressed into a relatively short period of 
completing formal education, entering the 
labour force, leaving home, establishing a 
nuclear household and having a first child. For 
subsequent cohorts, not only has this 
standardization broken down, but the early life-
course transitions have extended over a longer 
period, the sequencing is more diverse and 
events themselves are less clearly defined. These 
changes carry profound implications for society, 
as young adults take longer to establish 
themselves residentially, economically, as well as 
to form their own families. This is even more 
complicated by the simple fact that transitions 
to adulthood also appear to be less permanent 
and more subject to reversibility that in the past, 
as these transitions are often prolonged, 
complex, fragmented, and non-linear in nature.  
Clearly, many of these delays are interrelated, as 
for example, Canadian youth are far more likely 
to live at home if they continue to study full 
time, are not employed, are single, childless, and 
have relatively low earnings. Given changes in 
the character of Canada’s economy over recent 
decades and a climbing demand for high skills, 
it makes sense that the young spend more time 
in education, and are later in starting their first 
full-time employment. In turn, given the 
pressures on young men and women to 
establish themselves economically, it makes 
sense that unions and childbearing be delayed 
somewhat as education is completed and work 
lives established. Yet in this context, it is noted 
that the patterns as observed in Canada are not 
universal across western societies, as 
comparative research has suggested a number of 
different “transition regimes” (Van de Velde, 
2006; Walther, 2006). For that matter, as 
demonstrated in the current text, the nature of 
these patterns also varies considerably across 
different subpopulations within Canada, as was 
demonstrated by comparing early life transitions 
among Aboriginal Canadians and late transitions 
for immigrant youth. Even further, the nature 
of these transitions varies considerably across 
regions of the country, as for example, 
cohabitation in Quebec is now extremely 
widespread relative to other parts of the 
country. 
Transitions between youth and adulthood are 
structured by a complex system of socio-
economic structures, institutional arrangements, 
and cultural patterns that can vary in an 
important manner across nation states. Building 
on the work of Esping-Andersen (1990), Van de 
Velde (2006) provided a framework or typology 
of transitional regimes, which demonstrates 
how youth transitions have taken on multiple 
pathways across different societies. For 
example, Van de Velde contrasted the 
institutional arrangements and cultural patterns 
of the social democracies of Northern Europe 
(e.g., Denmark and Sweden) with the experience 
of youth in the more conservative welfare states 
in southern Europe (e.g., Spain and Italy). In 
addition, it is possible to contrast the liberalism 
of the United Kingdom with the more regulated 
economies of continental Europe (e.g., France 
and Germany). As argued, this broader context 
can potentially provide some insight as to why 
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transitions tend to be more prolonged in certain 
settings while being relatively short in others. 
Different types of welfare states arguably have 
important ramifications for the 
institutionalization of youth transitions. Welfare 
states shape the level of government assistance 
available to youth and their families, not to 
mention the potential recourse available to them 
in making the often difficult transition into the 
labour market. With the Nordic model, Van de 
Velde (2006) referred to Denmark’s 
comprehensive school system (which is noted 
for its flexibility in encouraging higher 
education), its relatively generous social 
transfers (including those directed toward 
youth), its universal system of child care, high 
rates of female employment, and extended 
public sector. In reviewing statistics on life-cycle 
transitions, Denmark is characterized by a 
relatively early independence for young adults, 
delayed and extended education, high levels of 
cohabitation, and an apparent tolerance for a 
relatively long period of self-exploration. In 
contrast, the Southern European situation is 
one whereby the state takes on a much lesser 
role, the economic opportunities for the young 
(and young women in particular) are more 
restricted, gender roles are more traditional, 
intergenerational solidarity is often high, and 
both the family and informal work play a pivotal 
role in the transition to adulthood. As a result, 
fundamental life transitions are often delayed. 
For example, in both Spain and Italy there is 
often a very late departure from the parental 
home. Due to economic weaknesses throughout 
much of southern Europe and high levels of 
youth unemployment, transitions are structured 
by a long waiting phase, with delayed marriage 
and childbearing until one can best afford the 
financial and time costs involved.  
Contrasts can be made across countries where 
home leaving is later and children depend on 
transfers within the family (as in Southern 
Europe), and earlier transitions given the 
availability of more state transfers, as in Nordic 
countries (Reher, 1998; Breen and Buchmann, 
2002; Iacovou, 2002). For cohorts born around 
1960, the median age at men’s home leaving 
ranges from 26 or 27 years in Italy and Spain, to 
20 years in Sweden (Billari et al., 2001). 
Independence from parents at affordable costs 
is reduced when there is a poor housing market 
and a lack of rental accommodation. In 
contrast, greater social transfers to young 
people, as occurs in Northern Europe, allows 
more independence from parents. The longer-
term consequences are not minor, as for 
example, fertility has fallen to very low levels in 
the south, as associated with delayed fertility 
(with total fertility rates hovering at only 1.2 in 
both Italy and Spain). In addition, McDonald 
(1997) suggested that childbearing appears to be 
particularly low in societies where women may 
aspire for equal status (in education and in the 
labour force), but where mothers carry an 
excessive burden within the family (a situation 
that seems to characterize both Italy and Spain). 
Faced with a choice between higher status in the 
labour force and low status in families, women 
are prompted to have “no families” (Chesnais, 
1996; Goldscheider and Waite, 1991). Again, the 
longer-term consequences are obvious in terms 
of slowing demographic growth and dramatic 
population aging. 
In drawing further comparisons, Van de Velde 
(2006) made reference to the liberal model that 
characterizes the United Kingdom, as one that 
values individual rights and responsibilities 
more than collective provisions. Relative to 
other countries in Europe, the United Kingdom 
has a less-regulated labour market, lower levels 
of investment in child care, and a higher priority 
placed on private responsibility in facing social 
risks. In many regards, the liberalism of the 
United Kingdom resembles that of North 
America, yet in examining youth transitions, the 
United Kingdom is characterized by a much 
earlier independence (relative to Canada, for 
example). This is true of leaving home, 
establishing marital unions and labour market 
integration. With fewer transfers from the state 
(in contrast to the Nordic model) and fewer 
opportunities for higher education (in contrast 
to North America), youth in the United 
Kingdom have responded with transitions that 
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occur at a relatively young age. Yet also relevant 
in this context is the much lower level of youth 
unemployment in the United Kingdom – at 7.9 
percent for young adults aged 20-24 in 2004 
(UNECE, 2006). This compares with fully 21 
percent unemployed in Italy and 19.9 percent in 
Spain. With an emphasis placed on individual 
initiative and responsibility in a context whereby 
there are economic opportunities, young adults 
seem to adapt with relatively short transitions, 
quick to establish themselves in the labour force 
(sometimes via a combination of work and 
study) and in relationships.  
The continental model (France, Germany) has 
highly regulated and standardized labour 
markets, an emphasis on vocational training, 
non-flexibility in terms of educational path, and 
social assistance programs that are somewhat 
more generous than those in the United 
Kingdom and North America. Yet in this 
context, Van de Velde described youth 
transitions that are relatively long with a gradual 
path to independence. These transitions are 
noted for their linearity in terms of education, 
ongoing difficulties with labour market 
integration, and semi-dependent situations that 
involve financial support from both parents and 
government. Again, while youth unemployment 
is high throughout much of Europe, it also 
remains stubbornly high in France and 
Germany (at 20.4 and 13.3 percent respectively, 
in 2004). Subsequently, as young people have 
difficulties in establishing themselves in the 
labour market, they often experience a 
prolonged period of independent role 
exploration. In this context, public policy 
initiatives are often quite supportive of the 
young, particularly via direct transfers to young 
adults who establish themselves in families. 
With declining rates of population growth and 
population aging, both France and Germany 
responded with policy initiatives that recognize 
the importance of supporting young families 
and, in particular, introduced policy initiatives 
that are essentially pronatalist in orientation.  
While Canada has yet to experience the extent 
of population aging and slowing demographic 
growth as characteristic of much of Europe, it 
does hold the potential for further fertility 
decline. As a liberal democracy, youth 
transitions are not nearly as short as in the 
United Kingdom, at least partially due to the 
high proportion of youth who pursue post-
secondary education. As aforementioned, many 
young adults complete their post-secondary 
studies with significant debt, while the problem 
of underemployment for both college and 
university graduates is real, and apparently 
growing in magnitude (Côté and Allahar, 2007). 
While youth unemployment might not be quite 
as high as in much of Europe, the opportunities 
available to youth with a low level of education 
have worsened. Youth transitions are 
increasingly delayed, at least partially the by-
product of blocked opportunities to establish 
independent households. The downward 
pressure in terms of earnings (for young men in 
particular) is consistent with the idea that 
difficult economic conditions contribute to this 
increased propensity to delay. There is further 
potential for fertility decline (below a current 
total fertility rate of 1.5), as for example, if the 
age-specific fertility rates of young women in 
Canada fall to levels recorded in some of the 
low-fertility countries of Europe. It is becoming 
increasingly obvious to young men and women 
in Canada that early childbearing without first 
establishing oneself economically can mean 
long-term disadvantages, which could very well 
lead to a further fertility decline into the future. 
Bianchi (2000) noted the advantages of delaying 
home leaving, marriage, and childbearing, to the 
extent that young adults invest in their human 
capital. Yet in reference to the situation in the 
United States, she also spoke of a bifurcation of 
models, as young families seem to be 
increasingly disadvantaged relative to families 
established by parents who have delayed 
marriage and first birth. Children born from 
mature parents are more likely to have the 
advantages of a mother with more human 
capital, along with the presence of a father in a 
dual-income family, which contrasts with the 
greater likelihood of lone parenthood for those 
who parent early. In the current study, we see 
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clear evidence from the 1991 and 2001 censuses 
to suggest an increased polarization of 
opportunities between the majority of young 
people who seem to postpone major life 
transitions (and in particular, the birth of a first 
child) relative to those who choose a “fast 
track.” In considering mothers with at least one 
child under the age of 5, the relative 
disadvantages of those who start family life 
earlier (e.g., before the age of 25) seems to have 
worsened somewhat over recent years relative 
to those who have their first child at an older 
age.  
Some authors have specifically spoken of a 
bifurcation of models in terms of early and late 
childbearing. In elaborating on the links 
between demographic and socio-economic 
vulnerability, Kiernan (2002) observed a “long 
arm of demography” in the sense that family 
demographics are differentiated based on the 
extent to which individuals are disadvantaged, 
and this selectivity has further implications for 
subsequent vulnerability. With this bifurcation, 
we see evidence of rising inequality across 
younger and older families. Similarly, Morissette 
(2002) documented rising inequality across age 
groups in Canada, as young workers fall behind 
older ages, as recent cohorts face greater 
economic difficulties than did older cohorts. In 
considering the relationship between 
demographics and disadvantage, Kiernan (2002) 
paid particular attention to youthful 
parenthood, unmarried families, and parental 
separation and divorce, as further aggravating 
the economic difficulties as experienced by 
youth. In a sense, Kiernan’s work demonstrates 
the utility of longitudinal analysis, following 
cohorts over an extended period, considering 
how socio-economic vulnerability might be 
passed from one generation to the next.  
In summary, many of the implications of these 
delays appear to be positive, at least in the 
Canadian context. By leaving home later, 
children receive more transfers from their 
parents; by staying in education longer, youth 
are better prepared for a world where the labour 
force grows much more slowly and we need to 
depend on the quality of workers. Two-worker 
families reduce the dependence of women on 
men, and reduce the exposure of women and 
children to the risks associated with family 
instability. Yet at the individual level, there are 
also negative implications, as for example, 
people may not have saved enough during a 
shorter work life, partly because they entered 
full-time work later, partly because children 
have spent more time in education, and have 
been slow in establishing their financial 
independence and leaving home. Yet the 
strongest negatives may very well be at the 
societal level, because delayed early life 
transitions bring lower fertility and population 
aging.  
It could be that our institutions have become 
too focused on supporting dependants at later 
ages, including personal and collective 
investments to support a long retirement 
period. To ensure that younger persons can 
become reproductive, we may need to work out 
better transfers toward the young at ages 
beyond the teen years. Aging societies are 
tempted to pay particular attention to the aged, 
which can undermine the very potential for 
reproduction and renewal. We should not 
ignore policies that apply particularly to people 
at ages where they are making these early life-
course transitions. Greater societal investments 
in post-secondary education would allow young 
people to leave home sooner, and to finish their 
education more efficiently without the 
distraction of part-time jobs. Greater 
investments in the school-to-work transition, 
especially for the benefit of those who leave 
school early, would reduce the uncertainties of 
the initial years on the labour market. Stronger 
investments in young families, including 
subsidies for parental leaves, tax benefits, 
reduced work hours and child care, would 
enable people in this stage of life to achieve 
their work and family goals.  
Such investments would be based on unique 
ways in which the human life course has 
evolved, with a long life expectancy, and long 
period of youth dependency subsidized by a 
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long period of post-reproductive productivity. 
As children stay at home longer, are supported 
by their parents for an extended period in order 
to benefit from a longer period of education 
and an easier transition into the labour market, 
one generation is potentially passing on benefits 
to the next. It is important to recognize that 
investments in the early stages of the life course 
provide the best basis for long-term security.  
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